The Constitutional Grammar of Indian Secularism: An Analysis of Religious Freedom and State Neutrality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23276323الكلمات المفتاحية:
Indian secularism، religious freedom، state neutrality، constitutional equality، essential religious practicesالملخص
There is nothing irrational or unsecular about the decisive influence of religion in Indian society, Indian secularism, in fact, depends on some form of constitutional arrangement which ensures protection of conscience, recognition of religious institutions, anti-discrimination and social reform mandates. Therefore, any equation state neutrality with total institutional separation becomes much more complex in the light of these commitments. This paper analyzes their link by a doctrinal reading of constitutional provisions and some selected judgements by the Supreme Court. It argues that neutrality is more appropriately conceived as a regime of public justification, that is, any action the state undertakes with respect to religion should be justified on the basis of constitutional purposes, respectful of equal citizenship and subject to judicial review. The analysis reveals an perennial conflict between protecting religious autonomy and permitting courts to decide on which practices ought to be accommodated. It also distinguishes between freedom of conscience and the institutional claims to control members choices. Because the answers to some proxy cases about religious endowments, conscientious objection, conversion, education and gender exclusion show that unrestricted intervention and categorical noninterference provides a satisfactory protocol. The interpretive framework proposed in this paper directs courts to discern the disputed right, determine whether the government had the proper legal authority to impose the burden, assess the specific burdens imposed and allow for proportional remedies where appropriate. This normative framework is described as a synthesis of constitutional commitments rather than an actual unified judicial test.
التنزيلات
المراجع
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الحقوق الفكرية (c) 2026 Oxford Law Review

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