The Constitutional Grammar of Indian Secularism: An Analysis of Religious Freedom and State Neutrality

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  • Shiv Kumar Dogra Himachal Pradesh University image/svg+xml Auteur·e
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  • Bineet Singh Himachal Pradesh University image/svg+xml Auteur·e
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DOI :

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23276323

Mots-clés :

Indian secularism, religious freedom, state neutrality, constitutional equality, essential religious practices

Résumé

There is nothing irrational or unsecular about the decisive influence of religion in Indian society, Indian secularism, in fact, depends on some form of constitutional arrangement which ensures protection of conscience, recognition of religious institutions, anti-discrimination and social reform mandates. Therefore, any equation state neutrality with total institutional separation becomes much more complex in the light of these commitments. This paper analyzes their link by a doctrinal reading of constitutional provisions and some selected judgements by the Supreme Court. It argues that neutrality is more appropriately conceived as a regime of public justification, that is, any action the state undertakes with respect to religion should be justified on the basis of constitutional purposes, respectful of equal citizenship and subject to judicial review. The analysis reveals an perennial conflict between protecting religious autonomy and permitting courts to decide on which practices ought to be accommodated. It also distinguishes between freedom of conscience and the institutional claims to control members choices. Because the answers to some proxy cases about religious endowments, conscientious objection, conversion, education and gender exclusion show that unrestricted intervention and categorical noninterference provides a satisfactory protocol. The interpretive framework proposed in this paper directs courts to discern the disputed right, determine whether the government had the proper legal authority to impose the burden, assess the specific burdens imposed and allow for proportional remedies where appropriate. This normative framework is described as a synthesis of constitutional commitments rather than an actual unified judicial test.

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Références

Aruna Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 368.

Bhargava, R. (2019). Reimagining secularism: Respect, domination and principled distance. In N. Bhuta (Ed.), Freedom of Religion, Secularism and Human Rights (pp. 21–52). Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198812067.003.0002.

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615.

Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282, 1954 SCR 1005.

Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, section 2.

Constitution of India. Preamble, Articles 14–17, 19, 25–30, 37, 44 and 356.

Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402, (1962) 1 SCR 383.

Galanter, M. (1971). Hinduism, secularism and the Indian judiciary. Philosophy East and West, 21(4), 467–487. DOI: 10.2307/1398174.

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.

Jacobsohn, G. J. (2003). The Wheel of Law: India’s Secularism in Comparative Constitutional Context. Princeton University Press.

Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, (2020) 2 SCC 1.

Kapur, R. (2020). Gender and the “faith” in law: Equality, secularism and the rise of the Hindu nation. Journal of Law and Religion, 35(3), 407–431. DOI: 10.1017/jlr.2020.42.

Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, Act 26 of 1937, section 2.

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Sen, R. (2010). Articles of Faith: Religion, Secularism and the Indian Supreme Court. Oxford University Press. Chapter 2, “The Doctrine of Essential Practices: The Judges Shape a Rational Hinduism,” pp. 40–72. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198063803.001.0001.

Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368.

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Vatuk, S. (2008). Islamic feminism in India: Indian Muslim women activists and the reform of Muslim personal law. Modern Asian Studies, 42(2–3), 489–518. DOI: 10.1017/S0026749X07003228.

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Publiée

2026-10-10

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Comment citer

Dogra, S. K., & Singh, B. (2026). The Constitutional Grammar of Indian Secularism: An Analysis of Religious Freedom and State Neutrality. Oxford Law Review, 1(2), 233-243. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23276323

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