Administrative Federalism in India: Constitutional Distribution of Power and the Changing Role of the Union

Abstrakt

Indian federalism is frequently analysed through the distribution of legislative and financial powers between the Union and the States. The administrative dimension, however, is equally significant because constitutional government ultimately depends upon the implementation of law through executive institutions operating across the same territory and population. This article examines administrative federalism as a distinct dimension of the Indian constitutional structure. It analyses the relationship between Articles 73 and 162, the administrative relations provisions in Articles 256–263, the role of Article 355 and Article 365, the constitutional position of the All India Services, and the institutional mechanisms of intergovernmental coordination. It further examines the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence, particularly State of Rajasthan v Union of India, S R Bommai v Union of India, State (NCT of Delhi) v Union of India and Government of NCT of Delhi v Union of India. The article argues that Indian administrative federalism cannot adequately be characterised either as straightforward centralisation or as an ideal model of cooperative federalism. Instead, the Constitution deliberately combines State administrative responsibility with significant Union powers of coordination, direction, delegation and, in exceptional circumstances, intervention. The changing role of the Union is therefore best understood as a constitutional relationship of differentiated autonomy and interdependence. The article concludes that the durability of this arrangement depends less upon eliminating Union influence than upon ensuring that Union powers are exercised within constitutional limits, through consultation and institutional accountability, while preserving the political and administrative space necessary for meaningful State self-government.